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COMMENT
Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications
for Toxic Tort Litigation
Alice had been looking over his shoulder with some curios-
ity. "What a funny watch!" she remarked. "It tells the day of
the month, and doesn't tell what o'clock it is!"
"Why should it?" muttered the Hatter. "Does yiuy_ watch
tell you what year it is?"
"Of course not," Alice replied very readily; "but that's be-
cause it stays the same year for such a long time together."
"Which is just the case with mine, " said the Hatter.
Alice felt dreadfully puzzled. The Hatter's remark seemed
to her to have no sort of meaning in it, and yet it was certainly
English. "'I don't quite understand you, " she said, as politely as
she could.'
It seems that the "Mad Hatter" was more a reflection of reality than
a caricature of fiction. Bernardino Ramazzini, a sixteenth century Italian
physician, observed that certain diseases tend to cluster within particular
occupational groups.2 Ramazzini implicated mercury, historically used
by hatmakers, as a cause of nervous system disorders-hence the Hat-
ter's madness.3 Observational studies like Ramazzini's were the progeni-
tors of the science of epidemiology and portents of the harm engendered
by certain occupational and environmental exposures.
Epidemiology is a discipline concerned with the causes and occur-
rence of disease in populations.4 One of the main goals of epidemiology
is disease prevention. The aim is "[t]o provide the basis for developing
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 60 (Holt, Rinehart and
Winston 1985) (1865).
2. HARVEY CHECKOWAY ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN OCCUPATIONAL EPIDEMI-
OLOGY 4 (1989) (citing BERNARDINO RAMAZZINI, DE MORBIs ARTIFICUM (DISEASES OF
WORKERS) (W.C. Wright trans., Hafner 1964) (1700)).
3. See id. In hatters, mercury caused "toxic mental changes, called madness, hence the
phrase 'mad as a hatter.'" STANLEY L. ROBBINS ET AL., PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE 452
(3d ed. 1984).
4. See ABRAHAM M. LILIENFELD & DAVID E. LILIENFELD, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDE-
MIOLOGY 3 (2d ed. 1980) ("Epidemiology is concerned with the patterns of disease occurrence
in human populations and of the factors that influence these patterns."); KENNETH J. ROTH-
MAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 23 (1986) ("The fundamental task in epidemiologic research is
thus to quantify the occurrence of illness. The goal is to evaluate hypotheses about the causa-
tion of illness and its sequelae and to relate disease occurrence to characteristics of people and
their environment."); Reuel A. Stallones, To Advance Epidemiology, 1 ANN. REV. PUB.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and evaluating preventive procedures and public health practices."' As a
science, epidemiology is in the early phases of development; many of its
basic tenets and methods have evolved only in the last thirty years." Epi-
demiological studies have increased public awareness of risk from expo-
sure to harmful substances, and in a rather circular manner this
heightened concern has provided an impetus for the continued develop-
ment of epidemiology and its use in the courtroom.
Epidemiological evidence can be crucial to the outcome of toxic tort
litigation. Attempts to apply epidemiology in the courtroom unfor-
tunately have resulted in confusion and inconsistent holdings.7 One
commentator, Michael Dore, notes that "[c]ourts have treated epidemio-
logical evidence inconsistently, largely as a result of their failure to recog-
nize its limitations in proving causation."8 To eliminate this confusion,
judges and lawyers must develop a basic understanding of epidemiology.
For, as Dr. Harold Ginzburg writes, "in litigation, the court is the ulti-
mate interpreter of epidemiologic data."9
This Comment provides an introduction to the logic of causal infer-
ence in epidemiology. It emphasizes that epidemiologists consider more
than mere statistical association when determining causation, including
factors such as the degree of consistency among studies and the strength
of the temporal relationship between cause and effect. This Comment
urges that the courts employ a similar analysis. It focuses primarily on
single-defendant situations"0 under a claim of negligence, in which expo-
sure to one substance" for which the defendant is responsible allegedly
HEALTH 69, 71 (1980) (The "territory of epidemiology... is presently generally agreed to be
the concern for the occurrence of disease (and, by inference, health) in groups of people.").
5. LILIENFELD & LILIENFELD, supra note 4, at 4.
6. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 2-3. See generally Stallones, supra note 4, at 69-70 (dis-
cussing the development of epidemiology in this century). A current and widely cited textbook
of epidemiology, Modern Epidemiology, by Dr. Kenneth J. Rothman, will form the basis for
much of the discussion in this Comment.
7. Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrat-
ing Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 429, 435 (1983); see also Troyen A. Brennan,
Untangling Causation Issues in Law and Medicine: Hazardous Substance Litigation, 107 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 741, 746 (1987) (stating that "[j]udges and juries are confused by epide-
miologic and probabilistic evidence of causation").
8. Dore, supra note 7, at 440.
9. Harold M. Ginzburg, Use and Misuse of Epidemiologic Data in the Courtroom: Defin-
ing the Limits of Inferential and Particularistic Evidence in Mass Tort Litigation, 12 AM. J.L. &
MED. 423, 428 (1986).
10. The presence of multiple defendants complicates the analysis of causation. Cases in-
volving multiple defendants are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of multi-
ple defendants, see Andrew G. Celli, Jr., Toward a Risk Contribution Approach to Tortfeasor
Identification and Multiple Causation Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 635, 635-39 (1990).
11. Although not addressed in this Comment, methods that analyze multiple causes of
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has caused a particular disease in the plaintiff. It notes that courts have
applied epidemiology in this context to address two related issues. 12 The
first issue is whether exposure to a particular substance is capable of
causing the disease. This is a population-level analysis that can be used
to determine negligence-whether the defendant has subjected the plain-
tiff to an unreasonable risk of harm. The second issue is an individual-
level analysis-whether the exposure has caused the plaintiff's harm.
This Comment maintains that epidemiological evidence is limited in its
legal applications.13 It concludes that the results generated from epide-
miological studies are particularly relevant to the determination of gen-
eral population-level causation, but that when used to determine
causation at the level of the individual, their relevance decreases and the
potential for prejudice increases. 14 This Comment recommends two
guidelines for courts to consider when evaluating the admissibility of evi-
dence based on epidemiology to prove legal cause: (1) whether the plain-
tiff can prove facts from which an inference of population-level causation
could be made, examining factors in addition to mere statistical associa-
tion; and (2) whether the plaintiff can prove facts to support an adequate
degree of external validity, ie., that the epidemiological study population
was similar enough to the plaintiff to make extrapolation reliable.15 This
Comment proposes the following guideline to be used when evaluating
the sufficiency of epidemiological evidence: the plaintiff has proved the
facts in (1) and (2) above, as well as additional facts that, when taken
together, make it more likely than not that exposure to a particular sub-
stance caused the plaintiff's disease.16
I. CAUSAL INFERENCE IN EPIDEMIOLOGY
Determining causation in epidemiology is a complex process. A
common misconception seems to be that epidemiologists rely solely on
statistical measures of association, such as the risk ratio, to determine
disease are currently being debated in epidemiology. See, eg., ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 311-
26 (acknowledging the current debate and describing a conceptual model based on the notion
of sufficient cause). Epidemiologists often use multiple regression analysis, a class of statistical
methods designed to study multiple causes of disease. DAVID G. KLEINBAUM ET AL., AP-
PLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND OTHER MULTIVARIABLE METHODS 1-6 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing biostatistical concepts and examples of research involving regression analysis). But
cf ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 4-5 (objecting to the notion that "[s]tatistical methodology in
multivariate modeling has often been transferred wholesale to epidemiology without giving
sufficient thought to the underlying epidemiologic concepts").
12. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
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causation.17 Although epidemiologists use statistics, the logic of causa-
tion extends well beyond the numbers alone. Statistical association is but
one of several factors considered in the analysis. 8
A. Measures of the Association between Cause and Effect
Epidemiologists derive mathematical measures of association be-
tween a putative cause and its effect from population-based data. Meas-
ures of association serve two basic functions. First, they are used to
determine the strength of the association, one of several guidelines used
in a determination of causation. 9 In addition, they are used to gauge
risk-the likelihood that exposure to a particular substance will cause
disease. Because much of the logic of causation in epidemiology depends
upon these measures, legal professionals using epidemiology should de-
velop a conceptual understanding of them. Courts often cite two basic
measures, the risk ratio and the attributable risk proportion. The follow-
ing sections present a brief description of these measures and several il-
lustrations of their use in the courtroom.
1. The Risk Ratio
In epidemiology, risk is quantitative-a number derived using a
mathematical formula. Because of factors such as study bias and error
due to chance,20 the resulting number represents, at best, a close approxi-
mation of the actual risk. The risk ratio, also known as relative risk,"'
may be defined as the risk of disease in a population segment exposed to a
particular substance, divided by the risk of disease in the rest of the pop-
ulation.22 The risk ratio represents how much more likely an exposed
17. See generally Dore, supra note 7, at 431 (defining epidemiology as "the statistical
study of disease in human populations"); Jeffrey Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic
Torts" Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 198 (1983) ("[Epidemiological] studies address issues of causality in
terms of statistical probabilities.").
18. Epidemiological causation determinations involve the balancing of many factors. See
infra notes 103-48 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
21. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 37. Other terms for the risk ratio are the relative rate,
rate ratio, and incidence rate ratio. Id.
22. The risk ratio is the measure of association commonly derived from a cohort study.
ROBERT H. FLETCHER ET AL., CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 195-97 (2d ed. 1988). In a cohort
study, the researcher defines a population (such as all workers at a particular type of manufac-
turing plant) and then divides the population into an exposed group (those exposed to the
substance in question) and an unexposed group (those not exposed to the substance). The
number of people in each group who contract the disease in question is recorded. Id. at 195.
The risk ratio is derived from this data. Two other epidemiological study types deserve men-
250 [Vol. 71
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person is to contract the disease than an unexposed person. 23 A compar-
ison is made between the proportion of persons with the disease in a
group of people exposed versus the proportion of persons with the dis-
ease in the group not exposed. If the substance is a cause of the disease,
the exposed group should have a larger proportion of people with the
disease. The risk ratio may be calculated as follows:2'
risk of disease in the exposed group
risk of disease in the unexposed group
or, equivalently,
number of exposed persons developing disease (over time)
total number of exposed people
divided by
number of unexposed persons developing disease (over time)
total number of unexposed people
This establishes a ratio of rates, representing the average likelihood of
contracting the disease after being exposed to a particular substance rela-
tive to the average likelihood of contracting the disease if not exposed.
When the risk ratio equals one, there are equal proportions of per-
sons with the disease in both the exposed group and the unexposed
group. This indicates that exposed persons do not contract the disease
more often than unexposed persons. In other words, there is no observed
association between the exposure and disease. When the risk ratio is
greater than one, exposed persons contract the disease more often than
those not exposed. In such a situation, an association exists between ex-
posure to the substance and the disease.25 When the risk ratio equals
three, for example, exposed persons are three times more likely to de-
velop the disease than unexposed persons. When the risk ratio equals
tion here: the case-control study and the prevalence study. These two study types produce an
odds ratio, which closely approximates the risk ratio under certain conditions. Id. at 196-97.
For a discussion of study design in epidemiology, see id. at 79-84, 96-101, 192-94, and 2
MICHAEL DORE, LAW OF Toxic TORTS § 25.05 (1992). The odds ratio closely approximates
the risk ratio only when the disease is rare in a population-when less than 10% of the popula-
tion has contracted the disease by the end of the study period. Sander Greenland & Duncan C.
Thomas, On the Need for the Rare Disease Assumption in Case-Control Studies, 116 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 547, 547-53 (1982).
23. To extrapolate accurately from population data to the level of the individual, one
would need to assume that all persons were nearly identical. In reality, this assumption cannot
be made. This raises the broader question of whether population data may ever be extrapo-
lated to the individual. See infra notes 41-45.
24. See generally ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 36-37 (calculating the risk ratio); CHECK-
OWAY et al., supra note 2, at 99 (defining risk ratio).
25. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 197.
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eight, exposed persons are eight times more likely to develop the disease,
and so forth. When the risk ratio is less than one, exposure to the sub-
stance exhibits a negative association with the disease and may actually
protect against the disease.26
A large risk ratio signifies a strong association, which is highly in-
dicative, although not determinative, of a causal relationship."7 Con-
versely, a nonexistent or extremely weak association, evidenced by a risk
ratio close to one, suggests, but does not prove, the absence of causation.
Some courts have viewed risk ratios greater than one as capable of prov-
ing causation. For example, the court in Oxendine v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 28 viewed testimony based on both an epidemiologi-
cal study with a risk ratio between 1.3 and 1.8 and other data sufficient to
present to the jury a question on the issue of causation.29 Although any
risk ratio greater than one logically would support the notion of a causal
relationship, it is very important to understand that epidemiologists con-
sider any risk ratio less than three to indicate a weak association. Risk
ratios less than three can be generated entirely by factors such as study
bias and lack of precision.31
2. The Attributable Risk Proportion
The attributable risk proportion (ARP) 32 represents "the proportion
of exposed [persons with the disease in the study] for whom the disease is
26. Id.
27. In addition to its utility in the determination of epidemiological causation, the risk
ratio also may be used in risk assessment. In this context, the risk ratio provides a rough
measure of the risk that exposure to a particular substance could result in a given disease. Risk
is an important concept in health care; it indicates whether physicians should recommend
certain treatments (such as surgery versus chemotherapy for certain cancers) or preventive
measures (such as low salt diets for persons with high blood pressure). Risk also is important
in the legal context of evaluating what reasonable care requires. See infra note 151 and accom-
panying text.
28. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990).
29. Id. at 1108, 1110.
30. Ernst L. Wynder, Guidelines to the Epidemiology of Weak Associations, 16 PREVEN-
TIVE MED. 139, 139 (1987).
31. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
32. The ARP is also termed the attributable proportion, the etiologic fraction in the ex-
posed, and the attributable risk percent. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 38 (citing Philip Cole &
Brian MacMahon, Attributable Risk Percent in Case-Control Studies, 25 BRIT. J. PREVENTIVE
& SOC. MED. 242, 242-44 (1971); Olli S. Miettinen, Proportion of Disease Caused or Prevented
by a Given Exposure, Trait or Intervention, 99 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 325, 325-32 (1974)). The
attributable risk proportion also has been called the "probability of causation." Junius C.
McElveen, Jr. & Pamela S. Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Problem of Causation
and the Use ofEpidemiology, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 29, 43 (1984-85). Probability of causation
is unfortunate terminology because the attributable risk proportion, without more, does not
prove causation and generally may not be extrapolated to the individual.
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attributable to the exposure."33 Assuming a cause-and-effect relationship
exists at the population level, the ARP also represents the probability of
randomly selecting, from the exposed, diseased group in the study, a per-
son whose disease was caused by the exposure. The AR is simply a
mathematical transformation using the risk ratio. It is employed after
causation has been established at the population level and is meaningful
only after a determination of population-level causation first has been
made. The ARP is calculated as follows:
34
Attributable risk ratio - 1
Risk Proportion - risk ratio
As the following calculation shows, a risk ratio of two will yield an
ARP of .50:
2-1 1 5ARP = 2 = = .50
An ARP of .50 means that half of the disease in the exposed study popu-
lation is likely to have been caused by the exposure and half is not likely
to have been caused by the exposure. This Comment will represent the
ARP as a percentage rather than a proportion. For example, an ARP of
.50 will be represented as 50%. As such, ARP will represent the attribu-
table risk percentage, rather than the attributable risk proportion. In this
context, an ARP of 50% means there is a 50% chance that the disease of
a person selected at random from the exposed group in a particular study
was due to the exposure. Notably, it does not mean that there is a 50%
chance that the disease of a given person outside the study was caused by
the exposure.
Before applying the ARP, causation should be determined at the
population level.3" Otherwise, the ARP merely represents the
probability that a person's disease is associated with, but not necessarily
caused by, the exposure.36 Accordingly, until population-level causation
has been determined, the concept of an ARP has no meaning. A court
that uses the risk ratio or ARP to assess individual causation prior to a
determination of population-level causation violates this premise. Table
I presents risk ratio and ARP estimates and indicates the approximate
strength of association at each level.
33. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 38.
34. Id.
35. See ihfra notes 112-48 and accompanying text.
36. An association is not tantamount to causation, but rather is one of several factors
epidemiologists consider in an overall causation assessment. See infra notes 103-48 and ac-
companying text.
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TABLE I. AN APPROXIMATION OF THE STRENGTH OF ASSOCIATION
EXHIBITED BY VARIOUS RISK RATIOS.
Approximate Strength
Relative Risk (ARP) of the Association Examples
1.1 to 3 (9%-67%) Weak or nonexistent Bendectin and birth defects
37
3 to 8 (67%-87%) Moderate Swine flu vaccine and Guillain-Barre
syndrome
38
8 to 16 (87%-94%) Strong Cigarette smoking and death due to
lung cancer
3 9
16 to 40+ (94%-97.5%) Extremely Strong High levels of radon and death due to
lung cancer
4 0
3. Use of the Risk Ratio and ARP by Courts
After causation is found at the population level, the ARP can be
probative, but not determinative, of causation in an individual. As the
following example illustrates, problems arise when risk estimates are ap-
plied to a particular individual. Epidemiological studies can predict the
risk of death from riding bicycles on roadways. But can the value of the
risk be applied with confidence to an individual cyclist in a particular
situation? The answer is certainly no. Such a value merely averages risk
and does not take into account potentially pertinent factors such as the
number of hours ridden per week, safety equipment worn, level of train-
ing, or type of roadway. Of course, studies can be designed to address
such factors. The more factors studied and the greater their similarity to
an individual's cycling style, the more confident one should be in apply-
ing risk estimates to the individual. As a population-based measure,
however, risk should be viewed as an estimation rather than a precise
quantification for a particular individual.
Some courts have focused on ARPs greater than 50% or, equiva-
lently, risk ratios greater than two, as the cut-off point for a "more likely
than not" burden of proof for legal cause in an individual. 41 These
37. Patricia H. Shiono & Mark A. Klebanoff, Bendectin and Human Congenital
Malformations, 40 TERATOLOGY 151, 151-55 (1989).
38. Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 1188, 1203-05 (D. Colo. 1980).
39. FLETCHER et a]., supra note 22, at 102 (estimated data from Richard Doll & Austin
B. Hill, Mortality in Relation to Smoking: Ten Years' Observations of British Doctors, 1 BRIT.
MED. J. 1399, 1402-03 (1964)).
40. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RADON REDUCTION TECHNIQUES FOR
DETACHED HOUSES 3 (1986) (radon exposure level of 0.2 WL). There is no single risk ratio
published for radon and lung cancer-the risk ratio varies with the level of radon exposure,
from a risk ratio of three to above 75. Id.
41. See, e.g., Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1437 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (stating
that when the risk ratio is greater than two, exposure to a substance is "more likely than not" a
[Vol. 71
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courts incorrectly assume this translates into a greater than 50% chance
that the plaintiff's disease was caused by exposure to the substance. The
use of the ARP and risk ratio in this manner is misguided. James Robins
and Sander Greenland examined this practice and concluded that it
could not be substantiated mathematically. a2 They stated, "the
probability of [individual] causation is non-identifiable." 43 In other
words, statistic-based epidemiological study results should not be applied
directly to establish the likelihood of causation in an individual plaintiff.
According to these authors, a population-based statistical measure rep-
resents a range of values, not a single value.' Using this reasoning, a
risk ratio greater than two, corresponding to an ARP greater than 50%,
should not be used without other evidence to satisfy a "more likely than
not" standard for legal cause in an individual.
A risk ratio of two simply means that persons in a study who have
been exposed to a particular substance are twice as likely to contract
disease than persons not exposed.45 Consider the following example:
Assume a hypothetical population of 100,100 people, 100 of
whom were exposed to a substance thought to cause a particu-
lar disease. This establishes two groups: an exposed group
(100 people) and an unexposed group (100,000 people). The
epidemiologist would count the number of people in each group
who developed the disease over a particular period of time. A
ratio would be set up using the risk ratio formula. Assume the
following numbers: of the 100 exposed persons, two develop
the disease, and of the 100,000 unexposed persons, 1,000 de-
velop the disease. Applying the formula:
cause of the disease), aff'd in part, 830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987); Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986) (indicating that a risk ratio of two is "an important
showing for plaintiffs to make because it is the equivalent of the required legal burden of
proof-a showing of causation by the preponderance of the evidence"), aff'd sub norm. Wheel-
ahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987); Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp.
306, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (stating that risk ratio of two would "sustain[ ] plaintiff's burden of
proof on causation"). For a discussion of statistical evidence used in Manko and Marder, see
DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION § 10.1.1, at
87-89 (Supp. 1989).
42. James Robins & Sander Greenland, The Probability of Causation Under a Stochastic
Model for Individual Risk, 45 BIOMETRIcS 1125, 1126 (1989).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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2 exposed persons with the disease
100 exposed persons
divided by
1000 unexposed persons with the disease
100,000 unexposed persons
This results in:
.02 - 2, a risk ratio of "2"
.01
The mathematics support the notion that an association exists be-
tween exposure and disease, but causation decisions are not made based
on mathematics alone. Although a risk ratio of two indicates that people
are twice as likely to contract the disease when exposed, epidemiologists
actually consider such numbers to be only weak support for causal infer-
ence. In the above example, two persons from a group of 100 exposed
contracted the disease. Had there been no exposure at all, one of these
persons would have been expected to contract the disease anyway. Intui-
tively, it is hard to look at such numbers and state that exposure to the
substance can cause the disease. By extension, courts certainly should
not use automatically a risk ratio of two as sufficient to prove legal cause.
4. Error as a Source of Uncertainty in the Risk Ratio
Error can seriously compromise an epidemiological study and im-
pair its usefulness in the courtroom. If population-level analyses contain
significant error, individual-level application to a plaintiff arguably would
compound the error. In an attempt to sift out potential sources of error,
epidemiologists address four general areas of concern: statistical signifi-
cance, lack of precision, scientific bias, and external validity.
a. Statistical Significance
Statistical significance represents the likelihood that the results of an
epidemiological study are due entirely to chance or random error.46 The
level of significance is represented usually by a "p-value" or, alterna-
tively, by a "confidence interval."'47 Statistical significance is a function
of study size and the amount of variance in the study population. A near
consensus of biological scientists, including epidemiologists, recognizes
statistical significance at a level that provides a 95% certainty that the
results generated are not due to chance alone. In most instances, this is
expressed as a p-value that is less than or equal to .05 or a 95% confi-
46. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 116.
47. Id. at 116, 119.
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dence interval that does not include the number one.48 Epidemiologists
often report study results as a risk ratio, a chi-square test statistic, and a
p-value, with or without a confidence interval.
A number of courts insist that epidemiological evidence be statisti-
cally significant if used to prove causation.49 This probably reflects a
suitable measure for acceptance of a particular study in the scientific
community. However, statistical significance is not determinative of cau-
sation. It is important to understand that statistical significance merely
reflects the likelihood that study results are due to chance or random
error. Furthermore, most statistical methods rely on the assumption that
the population being tested is a random sample.5 0 Therefore, statistical
significance does not address other types of error that tend to produce
nonrandom samples, such as scientific bias.51 For both of these reasons,
a study could be statistically significant yet still yield an incorrect result
due to scientific bias. Conversely, because statistical significance depends
on study size, a small study could yield an unbiased, correct result yet
suffer from a lack of statistical significance. Epidemiologists do not view
single studies, even if statistically significant, as establishing a causal rela-
tionship. Similarly, they do not view small studies with results that are
not statistically significant as definitive proof of the lack of causation.
b. Precision: Reduction of Error Due to Chance
Precision is a term that refers to "the extent to which repeated mea-
surements of a relatively stable phenomenon fall closely to each other."52
It reflects the reliability or reproducibility of a study. 3 In other words, if
the study or portions of it were repeated, precision represents how close
the results of latter studies would be to those of the earlier study. Classi-
cally, lack of precision has been thought to be due to the presence of
chance or random error.5" However, other factors, such as inconsistency
in study measurements and the inherent variability of human subjects,
48. Id. at 117. For a discussion of these concepts, see id. at 115-25; RiCHARD D. REM-
INGTON & M. ANTHONY SCHORK, STATISTICS WITH APPLICATIONS TO THE BIOLOGICAL
AND HEALTH SCIENCES 166-75 (2d ed. 1935).
49. E.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 312-13 (5th Cir.
1989) (rejecting plaintiff's claims because lack of statistical significance in available epidemio-
logical studies evidenced by a confidence interval that included the number one), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990).
50. For a discussion of random sampling in statistical analysis, see REMINGTON &
SCHORK, supra note 48, at 71-77.
51. For a discussion of these types of errors, see infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
52. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 23.
53. Id.
54. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 78.
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may contribute to lack of precision in epidemiological studies."5
Lack of precision is of greatest consequence when the association
between exposure to a substance and the disease is weak (risk ratio less
than three).5 6 In such a situation, lack of precision can defeat any at-
tempt to establish population-level causation. As a result, the study may
not be statistically significant, and it may appear that there is no associa-
tion when an association in fact exists.
Enlarging the study size is the dominant vehicle for correcting a
lack of precision. 7 The strength of the association that can be detected
at a given level of statistical significance depends on the size of the study;
a small study generally is able to detect only strong associations, but a
large study can detect both strong and weak associations.58 The litiga-
tion initiated by Vietnam War veterans exposed to the defoliant Agent
Orange illustrates this concept.59 In In re Agent Orange Product Liability
Litigation, the epidemiologic evidence revealed weak associations that
55. Humans are a diverse species; each person has different disease determinants and sus-
ceptibilities because of random, environmental, or genetic factors. See generally Leon Gordis
& Moyses Szklo, Causation From Groups to Individuals, 1 Crs. HEALTH Scl. & L. 362, 367-68
(1991) (discussing interaction between disease-causing agent and population subgroups in or-
der to identify those who are more susceptible to the agent). Both environmental and genetic
variables differentiate human subjects. As an example, consider oral contraceptives, an envi-
ronmental disease determinant. Women taking oral contraceptives have different risk profiles
from those not taking contraceptives. In particular, women taking contraceptives are at in-
creased risk of disorders that can lead to a heart attack. Id. at 367. Susceptibility to high
blood pressure is an example of a genetic determinant of disease. "[S]ome individuals, when
exposed to a high salt intake ... develop high blood pressure, whereas the same would not be
true for other individuals lacking the relevant genetic trait." Id.
One epidemiologist writes:
I believe that we have a central axiom, not subject to proof, but upon which epidemi-
ology is based, and without which no epidemiology is possible.
Axiom: Disease does not distribute randomly in human populations.
Corollary 1: Nonrandom aggregations of human disease are manifested along axes of
measurement of time, of space, of individual personal characteristics, and of certain
community characteristics.
Corollary 2: Variations in the frequency of human disease occur in response to varia-
tions in the intensity of exposure to etiologic agents or other more remote causes, or
to variations in the susceptibility of individuals to the operation of those causes.
Stallones, supra note 4, at 80.
56. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
57. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 79.
58. The study size needed to detect differences between populations can be calculated.
REMINGTON & SCHORK, supra note 48, at 181. This calculation requires that researchers first
specify the desired significance level, usually a p-value less than or equal to .05, and estimate in
advance the size of the risk ratio. Id.
59. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 787-94 (E.DN.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
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overall were not statistically significant. 6 The court concluded that the
epidemiological studies did not "furnish sufficient support for plaintiffs'
casuality [sic] claims... because of their small size, self-selective nature
and other defects." 61
Study size also was crucial in Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. (In re Bendectin Litigation), which consolidated claims of more
than 800 plaintiffs who alleged that the defendant's morning sickness
drug had caused birth defects in children whose mothers took the drug. 62
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict for the defend-
ant.63 The court reviewed the following testimony by the plaintiffs' ex-
perts that addressed the issue of lack of precision: "the numbers ... were
too small" and "the study was incapable of detecting a relative [risk] for
limb reductions that was smaller than sixfold." As the court noted,
such evidence can be an important factor in the overall assessment of
admissibility.
c. Internal Validity-Lack of Scientific Bias
A valid study lacks significant scientific bias. Scientific bias is de-
fined as
any systematic error in the design, conduct, analysis, or inter-
pretation of a study that tends to produce an incorrect assess-
ment of the nature of the association between an exposure...
and the occurrence of disease. More generally, bias has been
defined as "any process at any stage of inference which tends to
produce results or conclusions that differ systematically from
the truth.
6
Bias leads to a deviation of the study results, causing the perceived asso-
ciation to differ from the actual association. Bias is particularly trouble-
some for studies with weak statistical associations (risk ratio less than
60. Id. at 790. For a discussion of statistical significance, see supra notes 46-51 and ac-
companying text.
61. Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. at 787; see also Troyen A. Brennan,
Can Epidemiologists Give Us Some Specific Advice?, 1 Crs. HEALTH Sci. & L. 397, 397 (1991)
(discussing the Agent Orange litigation); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV.
1219, 1235 (1987) ("The key flaw in the plaintiffs' case was that government epidemiological
studies... [and] [s]tudies by the Air Force, the CDC, and the Australian government all had
concluded that no [significant] health effects had been demonstrated.").
62. 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
63. Id. at 326.
64. Id. at 318-19.
65. Manning Feinleib, Biases and Weak Associations, 16 PREVENTIVE MED. 150, 150
(1987) (citations omitted). For a discussion of bias, see CHECKOWAY et al., supra note 2, at
77-96; FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 7-14; and ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 82-94.
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three). 6 In such a study, if bias inflates the measure of association, the
study's risk ratio is larger than it should be, and an innocuous substance
may appear to cause disease. Alternatively, when bias decreases the mea-
sure of association, the study's risk ratio is smaller than it should be,
leading to the conclusion that a substance does not cause disease when
the converse is true.
Bias falls into three general categories: confounding, selection bias,
and information bias.6 7 As illustrated by Bendectin Litigation,68 courts
generally treat testimony regarding study bias as relevant and admissi-
ble.69 However, evidence of bias may not be sufficient to refute values
that are either very strong or very weak. Even though the plaintiffs' wit-
nesses identified multiple sources of potential study bias, the judge in
Bendectin Litigation viewed the absence of a statistical association as de-
terminative, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of prov-
ing causation.7'
The first general category of bias, confounding, "occurs when two
factors or processes are [statistically] associated or 'travel together,' and
the effect of one is confused with or distorted by the effect of the other.1
7 1
Confounders can alter study results if they are distributed unequally in
the population groups being compared. The court in Bendectin Litiga-
tion reviewed testimony that illustrates confounding.72 In Bendectin Liti-
gation, the plaintiffs offered expert testimony that there was no
mechanism to control "for age or for other drugs.""3 The two potential
confounders in this instance were age and the use of drugs other than
Bendectin. Either of these factors could have increased the rate of birth
defects, thereby skewing study results.
Bendectin Litigation also illustrates a second category of bias, selec-
tion bias. Selection bias results when improper procedures are used to
select study subjects.74 A Bendectin expert witness testified that "some
patients were included as both Bendectin [patients] and controls." 75
66. Feinleib, supra note 65, at 150.
67. See, eg., id. ("[Tihe varieties of biases that have been described in the literature are
legion.").
68. Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at 318-19.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 314.
71. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 8. See generally 2 DORE, supra note 22,
§ 25.02(4)(a) (discussing bias).
72. Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at 318.
73. Id.
74. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 83; see also 2 DORE, supra note 22, § 25.02(4)(b) (discuss-
ing bias); Feinleib, supra note 65, at 155-60 (same).
75. Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at 319.
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Such selection procedures could have skewed the results.
The third category of bias, information bias, distorts the study
results because of "errors in obtaining . . . needed information. "
76
The plaintiffs in Bendectin Litigation offered the following testimonial
evidence: "[P]atients that were supposed to have used Bendetin... may
not have in fact ingested it because there was nothing to record that they
had ever been administered the drug."' 77 This illustrates information bias
because it relates to information-gathering techniques. Specifically, the
study lacked documentation of whether patients actually took the drug.
Bias is a pervasive factor in epidemiological studies. Although re-
searchers utilize complex means for preventing or mathematically cor-
recting for bias, unrecognized bias can affect even well-designed studies.
Successfully controlling bias generally increases a study's internal valid-
ity, which is defined as "the validity of the inferences drawn as they per-
tain to the actual subjects in the study."' 78 Internal validity focuses on
the actual subjects within the study, not on persons outside the study. If
a study appropriately controls for significant bias, the risk ratio and ARP
are likely to be valid for subjects within the study. This distinction is
legally important since the plaintiffs usually are outside the actual study.
Applicability to persons outside the study falls under the rubric of exter-
nal validity, discussed in the next section. Before assessing external va-
lidity, however, the internal validity of the study must be established.
d. External validity
External validity concerns the appropriateness of applying epidemi-
ological findings to persons outside the study.79 It is an important con-
cept because study results do not apply automatically to outside persons.
After all, epidemiological study populations are merely samples of larger
populations and may not be representative of those outside the study. Sir
Austin Bradford Hill, a renowned epidemiologist, noted that the "[study]
sample may, indeed be akin to that of the man who, according to Swift,
'had a mind to sell his house and carried a piece of brick in his pocket,
which he showed as a pattern to encourage purchasers.' "so At times, it
76. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 84; see also 2 DORE, supra note 22, § 25.02(4)(c) (discuss-
ing information bias); Feinleib, supra note 65, at 160-63 (discussing bias).
77. Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at 318.
78. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 82.
79. S. Hernberg, Validity Aspects of Epidemiological Studies, in EPIDEMIOLOGY OF OCCU-
PATIONAL HEALTH 269, 273-74 (M. Karvonen & M.I. Mikheev eds., 1986); ROTHMAN, supra
note 4, at 82.
80. Austin B. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC.
ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 295, 299 (1965).
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can be as ridiculous to use a sample to characterize the entire human race
as to rely on a single brick to convey the appearance of a home.
The concept of external validity is significant legally because it is
rare for a plaintiff to be an actual subject of an epidemiological study. A
reasonable degree of external validity as applied to the particular plaintiff
should be present before an epidemiological study is considered probative
of causation in the plaintiff. Some commentators disagree with this con-
clusion and express more confidence in the predictive power of a study
sample. McCormick on Evidence adopts this latter view: "Samuel John-
son once remarked that 'You don't have to eat the whole ox to know the
hide is tough.' "81
No scientific methodology for analyzing external validity exists; in-
deed the subject often is not even addressed. External validity is a quali-
tative determination and is, therefore, "ultimately a matter of informed
judgement." 2 Courts are particularly well-suited to make this determi-
nation. Essentially, one compares the characteristics of the study popu-
lation to persons outside the study; similarity in all potentially pertinent
factors is the dominant concern. 3 A pertinent factor could be, for exam-
ple, the gender of the study subjects compared with the plaintiff's gender.
If the subjects of the study were male and the plaintiff female, the sub-
stance-disease association should be examined to see if gender is a perti-
nent factor. The following excerpt illustrates such an analysis:
[F]rom a study of smoking and lung cancer in men, one might
generalize the results to a target population of women. To do
so presumes that being male is irrelevant to the carcinogenic
action that smoking has on lung tissue, a judgment based on
knowledge about the likely mechanism of carcinogenesis and
the biologic similarity between male and female lungs. On the
other hand, a study of diet and [heart attack] in men might not
be considered generalizable to women because physiologic dif-
ference between the sexes may play a role in the causal
process.
8 4
An epidemiological study is more likely to be legally probative if the
plaintiff is similar to the study subjects with regard to all pertinent char-
acteristics. Expert testimony or other evidence could identify the perti-
nent characteristics. Absent such evidence, courts could look for
similarity in characteristics such as gender, age, and exposure level.
81. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 208, at 935-36 (4th ed. 1992) (quot-
ing DAVID S. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS & CONTROVERSIES 3 (2d ed. 1985)).





B. Statistical Association and Causation
"Cause" in epidemiology has been defined as "an event, condition,
or characteristic that plays an essential role in producing an occurrence
of the disease."85 A principal question asked in epidemiology is whether
exposure to a particular substance causes disease at the population
level. 6 In considering this question, it is extremely important to under-
stand that statistical association does not establish causation.8 7 Additional
factors must be considered. Hill decried the use of statistics, without
more, to determine population-level causation, stating:
[I]s there any other way of explaining the set of facts before us,
is there any other answer equally, or more, likely than cause
and effect?... No formal tests of [statistical] significance can
answer those questions. Such tests can, and should, remind us
of the effects that the play of chance can create, and they will
instruct us in the likely magnitude of those effects. Beyond that
they contribute nothing to the "proof" of our [causal]
hypothesis."8
The following examples illustrate this point. In 1852, a scientific
paper documented a strong association between low altitude and cholera,
maintaining that low altitude was the cause of cholera. 9 Subsequent re-
search dispelled this notion, establishing that the Vibrio cholerae bacteria,
not low altitude, causes cholera." The erroneous conclusion of the 1852
study illustrates the danger of relying solely on statistics to "prove"
causation.
A more recent example is seen with the documented association be-
tween acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and the illicit use
of nitrate inhalants. Nitrate inhalants are drugs used by a number of gay
men who later contracted AIDS.91 Based on this association, early stud-
85. Id at 11.
86. CHECKOWAY et al., supra note 2, at 13. A population-level analysis does not focus on
whether exposure to a particular substance causes disease in a given individual, but rather on
whether the exposure causes illness in apopulation-specifically, whether there are more cases
of disease with the exposure than would have occurred without the exposure. Id.
87. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 7-21.
88. Hill, supra note 80, at 299.
89. Michael Dore, A Proposed Standard for Evaluating the Use of Epidemiological Evi-
dence in Toxic Tort and Other Personal Injury Cases, 28 How. L.J. 677, 681 n.8 (1985) (citing
William Farr, Influence of Elevation on the Fatality of Cholera, 15 J. STAT. Soc'Y LONDON
155 (1852)).
90. See Gerald T. Keusch, Cholera, in I HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 632, 632 (Jean D. Wilson et al. eds., 12th ed. 1991).
91. Bert Black, Matching Evidence About Clustered Health Events With Tort Law Re-
quirements, 132 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY S79, S82 (Supp. 1990); James J. Goedert, Recreational
Drugs: Relationship to AIDS, 437 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 192, 197-98 (1984).
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ies suggested that the nitrate inhalants may have caused the depressed
immune system in AIDS.92 Scientists then looked at other factors such
as the person-to-person transmission of AIDS through sexual contact or
needle sharing, hypothesizing that an unknown infectious agent caused
the disease.93 This latter interpretation proved correct: AIDS is now
known to be caused by an infectious agent, the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV)9
4
The association between nitrate inhalants and AIDS illustrates that
two factors can be related, perhaps through a third factor, without hav-
ing any cause and effect relationship. Statistical correlations also may
exist entirely due to chance. As Professor Paul Sherman writes, "A sta-
tistical correlation may exist between two groups of numbers with no
causal relationship being even possible."9 Sherman cites the docu-
mented "direct statistical relationship between pig iron production in the
United States and the British birth rate."96 It would be ridiculous to
conclude solely from this association that a direct cause and effect rela-
tionship exists between these two events.
The previous examples illustrate that statistical association alone
cannot establish that a substance is capable of causing disease. Neverthe-
less, some legal commentators have suggested that at some level statisti-
cal association could be strong enough to satisfy a "more likely than not"
standard in determining legal cause. 97 This concept is misguided, violat-
ing epidemiological tenets9" as well as the legal doctrine of many
courts. 99 Causation is an elusive concept that cannot be determined
92. Goedert, supra note 91, at 192-97.
93. Id.
94. Anthony S. Favci & Clifford Lane, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), in 2 HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 90, at 1402-03.
95. Paul Sherman, Agent Orange and the Problem of the Indeterminate Plaintiff, 52
BROOK. L. REv. 369, 384 n.81 (1986).
96. Id. (citing GEORGE W. SNEDOCOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISICAL METH-
ODS 189 (6th ed. 1967)).
97. E.g., Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of
Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521, 521-23 (1986) [hereinafter Nesson, Agent Orange]. Professor
Nesson suggests that "[a]t some point, high probability alone is sufficient to produce an accept-
able verdict." Id. at 522 n.3.
98. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 4 ("[S]tatistical hypothesis testing is a mode of analysis
that offers less insight into epidemiologic data than alternative methods .... [It] has often
been transferred wholesale to epidemiology without giving sufficient thought to the underlying
epidemiologic concepts.").
99. See, ag., Crim v. International Harvester Co., 646 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that testimony that a significant association exists between a particular occupation
and "valley fever does not constitute evidence of a causal connection"); Heckman v. Federal
Press Co., 587 F.2d 612, 617 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[S]tatistical data about a group do not establish
concrete facts about an individual."); Robinson v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 320, 330 (E.D.
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solely by numerical calculations in either epidemiology or the law.
One widely cited logical exercise illustrating the dilemma courts face
is the Blue Bus hypothetical, described by Professor Charles Nesson as
follows:
While driving late at night on a dark, two-laned road, a person
confronts an oncoming bus speeding down the centerline of the
road in the opposite direction. In the glare of the headlights,
the person sees that the vehicle is a bus, but cannot otherwise
identify it. He swerves to avoid a collision, and his car hits a
tree. The bus speeds past without stopping. The injured person
later sues the Blue Bus Company. He proves, in addition to the
facts stated above, that the Blue Bus Company owns and oper-
ates 80% of the buses that run on the road where the accident
occurred. Can he win?l" °
Nesson reasons that under a "more likely than not" standard that per-
mits the plaintiffs to rely solely on statistics, a plaintiff would always re-
cover if more than 50% of the buses were owned by the defendant's
company.101 Such a result could be considered unfair to a potentially
non-negligent defendant. In reference to the Blue Bus hypothetical, he
comments that "the acceptability of a conclusion is not a simple function
of mathematical probability, but rather is a complex matter ...that
depends on the nature of the issue, the process of decision, and the pur-
poses and audiences the conclusion serves." 102
It is important to consider Nesson's comments in context, realizing
that his rendering of the hypothetical represents a different situation
from the one addressed by this Comment. In Nesson's hypothetical, sta-
tistics were particularly suspect, since they were being used to prove the
identity of the defendant and, by extension, negligence and legal cause.
It is not difficult to reject the use of statistic-based analyses in such a
situation. By contrast, in the situation addressed by this Comment, sta-
Mich. 1982) ("Statistical evidence cannot establish cause and effect."); see also Leonard R.
Jaffee, Of Probativity and Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of
Chance at Trial, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 925, 934 (1985) ("A statement of probability is merely an
uncertain estimate of actuality."); Trauberman, supra note 17, at 198 & n.23 (1983) (stating
that "courts have been reluctant to accept probabilistic evidence as showing causation"); Lau-
rence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 1329, 1341 n.37 (1971) (citing Smith v. Rapid Transit, 317 Mass. 469, 470, 58 N.E.2d
754, 755 (1945) (holding that it is not enough that "'the mathematical chances somewhat
favor the proposition'" to be proved)).
100. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1378-79 (1985) [hereinafter Nesson, The Evidence or the
Event?].
101. Id.
102. Nesson, Agent Orange, supra note 97, at 522.
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tistic-based evidence appears much later in the analysis. A defendant has
been identified already and a plaintiff has been exposed to a particular
substance because of the defendant's actions. A Blue Bus hypothetical
analogous to this situation might be stated as follows:
While standing in a large crowd at the bus station, a man be-
comes aware that a bus from the Blue Bus Company is nearing
the crowd. The bus pulls into the station, and the crowd moves
to stay clear of the bus. The man, although jostled somewhat
by the crowd, does not appear to have been injured. Two years
later, he develops pain in his lower back, and x-rays reveal a
slipped disc. He sues the Blue Bus Company. He proves, in
addition to the facts stated above, that statistics indicate it is
dangerous for busses to drive near crowds because this can
cause injuries to those in the crowd. In addition, he proves" that
there are more back injuries in crowd-related accidents than
would be normally expected. Can he win?
In this hypothetical, the potentially liable party has been identified; the
only remaining questions are negligence and causation. In such a situa-
tion, statistics seem less objectionable than in Nesson's stated hypotheti-
cal. Nevertheless, a given level of mathematical proof should not be
entirely determinative.
C. Guidelines Used to Determine Causation in Epidemiology
There is some disagreement among epidemiologists concerning the
procedures to be followed when determining causation. Most epidemiol-
ogists agree that there are two absolute requirements for causation: (1)
temporality-the putative cause must precede its effect; and (2) associa-
tion-there must be a statistical association between exposure to a sub-
stance and its effect.103 Satisfaction of temporality and association is not
sufficient to establish causation, however, and epidemiologists will con-
sider additional factors, such as the biological plausibility of causation
and the consistency of results among studies.
Criteria published in 1965 by Bradford Hill are often used as guide-
lines for the determination of causation (Table II). 14 Not all epidemiol-
103. Mervyn Susser, What is a Cause and How Do We Know One? A Grammar for Prag-
matic Epidemiology, 133 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 635, 638 (1991).
104. Hill, supra note 80, at 295; see also CHECKOWAY et al., supra note 2, at 13 (discussing
various criteria) (citing Alfred S. Evans, Causation and Disease: a Chronological Journey, 108
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 249 (1978)); James J. Schlesselman, "Proof" of Cause and Effect in
Epidemiologic Studies: Criteria for Judgement, 16 PREVENTIVE MED. 195, 199-203 (1987)
(discussing Bradford Hill criteria and other proposed criteria). Table II can be found at infra
text accompanying note 111.
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ogists use the Bradford Hill criteria, however;' some refuse to venture
into the realm of causal inference at all.'0 6 Dr. Kenneth J. Rothman
mentions, although does not necessarily advocate, the view that causal
inference lies in the domain of public policy."7
Despite differing views, the Bradford Hill criteria are widely em-
ployed by epidemiologists'0 8 and will be used in this Comment to illus-
trate causal inference in epidemiology. The criteria, listed in modified
form in Table II, include: (1) statistical association; (2) temporality; (3)
biological plausibility and coherence; (4) dose-response gradient; (5) con-
sistency; (6) analogy; (7) experimental evidence; and (8) specificity.' 09
105. Several commentators have recommended using a set of causal criteria known as the
Henle-Koch postulates. See 2 DORE, supra note 22, § 25.04(4); Bert Black & David E.
Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 732, 763
(1984). Epidemiologists consider the Henle-Koch postulates to be limited, however, to situa-
tions involving exposure to infectious microorganisms. Susser, supra note 103, at 640; see also
Marcia A. Mobiliz and Annette M. Rossignol, The Role of Epidemiology in Detennining Cau-
sation in Toxic Shock Syndrome, Fall JURIMETRICS J. 78, 82-84 (1983) (applying the Henle-
Koch postulates to toxic shock syndrome). The International Agency for Research on Cancer
has suggested five criteria comparable to the Bradford Hill criteria to establish cancer causa-
tion. McElveen & Eddy, supra note 32, at 44-45 (citing 17 IARC 18 (1978)). The Bradford
Hill criteria arose out of an earlier set of causal criteria advanced by the Surgeon General's
Report on Smoking and Health in 1964. These criteria were consistency, strength, specificity,
temporal sequence, and coherence. Feinleib, supra note 65, at 151 (citing 1964 SURGEON
GEN. REP. ON SMOKING AND HEALTH). Other approaches to causal inference include that of
Susser, who has urged consideration of three essential criteria: (1) association: a cause must
be associated with its effect; (2) time order: a cause must precede its effect; and (3) direction: a
change in an effect must be the result of a change in the putative cause. Susser, supra note 103,
at 638-39.
106. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 20. Some epidemiologists reject the process of causal
inference and the notion of criteria, instead favoring approaches based on deductive reasoning
that arise in part from the philosophical works of Karl Popper. For a discussion of deductive
reasoning and the influence of Popper, see Susser, supra note 103, at 642-43. See generally
ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 7-10 (discussing the philosophy of scientific inference).
107. Rothman states:
Recently, Lanes ... has proposed that causal inference is not part of science at all,
but lies strictly in the domain of public policy. According to this view, since all
scientific theories could be wrong, policy makers should weigh the consequences of
actions under various theories. Scientists should inform policy makers about scien-
tific theories, and leave the choice of a theory and an action to policy makers. Not
many public health scientists are inclined toward such a strict separation between
science and policy, but as a working philosophy it has the advantage of not putting
scientists in the awkward position of being advocates for a particular theory ....
Indeed, history shows that skepticism is preferable in science.
ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 20 (citing S. Lanes, Causal Inference is Not a Matter of Science,
122 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 550, 550 (1985); Kenneth J. Rothman & Charles Poole, Science
and Policy Making, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 340, 340-41 (1985)).
108. Joshua E. Muscat & Michael S. Huncharek, Causation and Disease: Biomedical Sci-
ence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 31 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 997, 997 (1989).
109. See Hill, supra note 80, at 295-300.
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Not every criterion must be met for a causal relationship to be present;
commonly at least one remains unsatisfied.110 Rather than treating the
criteria as a checklist, epidemiologists employ a balancing approach,
viewing the criteria as a framework for weighing the evidence of causa-
tion. Some criteria are weighted more heavily than others. For example,
a strong statistical association, while not sufficient to establish causation,
lends more support to causal inference than does a high degree of plausi-
bility and coherence. In addition, strength in one criterion may compen-
sate for weaknesses in others: a strong temporal relationship may
balance in favor of causation even in the face of a weak statistical
association.
TABLE II: BRADFORD HILL CRITERIA-GUIDELINES OFrEN USED BY
EPIDEMIOLOGISTS IN THE ASSESSMENT OF POPULATION.LEVEL
CAUSATION. III
Statistical Association. There must be some degree of statistical association between a cause and its
effect. A strong association (large in magnitude) is more likely to represent causation than a weak
association (small in magnitude).
Temporality. A cause must precede its effect. Strength in temporality, such as when a cause imme-
diately precedes its effect, supports an inference of causation.
Biological Plausibility and Coherence. A cause and effect relationship between exposure and disease
should be biologically plausible and consistent with other information about the disease or harm,
Dose-Response Effect. Causation is more likely if greater amounts of the putative cause are associ-
ated with corresponding increases in the occurrence of disease or harm.
Consistency. When similar findings are generated by several epidemiological studies involving vari-
ous investigators, causation tends to be supported.
Analogy. Substantiation of relationships similar to the putative causal relationship increases the
likelihood of causation.
Experimental Evidence. Causation is more likely if removing the exposure in a population results in
a decrease in the occurrence of disease or harm.
Specificity. When there is but a single putative cause for the disease or harm, causation is
supported.
1. Statistical Association
Epidemiologists assess association by applying mathematical formu-
las to the results of well-designed population studies,11 2 generating meas-
ures of association, such as the risk ratio. The strength of the association
110. As Hill stated, "None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or
against the cause-and-effect hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua non." Id. at
299. But cf supra text accompanying note 103 (temporality and association considered abso-
lute requirements for causation).
111. See ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 16-20; Hill, supra note 80, at 295-99.
112. Poor study design can seriously impair the epidemiologist's ability to assess meaning-
fully the strength of the association. FLETCHER et a]., supra note 22, at 215-16; Moyses Szklo,
Design and Conduct of Epidemiologic Studies, 16 PREVENTIVE MED. 142, 148-49 (1987).
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is structured conceptually on a continuum, ranging from measures epide-
miologists view as weak to those considered extremely strong." 3
Epidemiological causal inference requires at least some degree of as-
sociation. Although epidemiologists may accept a weak association
when demonstrated strength exists in the other Bradford Hill criteria, a
stronger association provides more evidence for inferring a causal rela-
tionship.1 4 Stronger associations tend to compensate for the inherent
weaknesses in population-based study designs."1 Strong associations are
preferred because they are less likely to be due to errors such as hidden
bias." 6 A weak association, by contrast, easily could have been gener-
ated by error alone.
2. Temporality
The temporality criterion represents the notion that a cause must
precede its effect. Satisfaction of temporality is considered a requirement
for causal inference." 7 Strength in temporality, such as when a disease
occurs shortly after its supposed cause, can add much credence to an
association that is weak in other criteria. For example, in a series of
cases the plaintiffs claimed they contracted a nervous system disorder,
Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS), from the swine flu vaccine given in the
mid-1970s. 18 A study under the auspices of the Centers for Disease
Control in Atlanta determined that the swine flu vaccine was a cause of
GBS, but only during a ten-week period immediately following the vacci-
nation." 9 The strength of the temporal relationship was striking, with
GBS incidence increasing shortly after vaccination and decreasing to
113. See supra Table I, text accompanying notes 37-40.
114. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 17-18.
115. A physician from the National Cancer Institute explains:
[Epidemiological studies] are quite weak at identifying the causes of very low levels
of risk. Very small differences in risk between a group exposed to some substance
versus that in a group not exposed to it could be due to a variety of reasons: for
example, chance, or other differences between the exposed and unexposed which we
either do not know about or cannot adequately control for.
McElveen & Eddy, supra note 32, at 39-40 (quoting Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 45 Fed.
Reg. 5,040 (1980) (testimony of Dr. Robert Hoover)).
116. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 217. For a discussion of bias and other factors that
can influence epidemiological study results, see supra notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
117. See ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 19. Rothman describes temporality as "a sine qua
non: If the 'cause' does not precede the effect, that indeed is indisputable evidence that the
association is not causal." Id.
118. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 122.
119. Lawrence B. Schonberger et al., Guillain-Barre Syndrome Following Vaccination in
the National Influenza Immunization Program, United States, 1976-1977, 110 AM. J. EPIDEMI-
OLOGY 105, 105 n.1 (1979).
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normal within 10 weeks. A government compensation program was es-
tablished for the victims. 120 Before awarding compensation, the govern-
ment required victims to show proof of swine flu vaccination and onset of
GBS within ten weeks of vaccination.12 1 After the act was passed, a
number of claimants who contracted GBS outside the ten-week window
unsuccessfully brought suit against the government.'
22
Although temporality is necessary, it is not sufficient to establish
epidemiological or legal causation. For example, several of the lawsuits
arising from the swine flu vaccination program were unsuccessful be-
cause they were based almost entirely on temporality. The plaintiffs had
contracted diseases other than GBS within a short time after being vacci-
nated for swine flu. Although temporality was strong, statistical associa-
tion was weak or non-existent.1 23 These plaintiffs failed to establish the
government's liability. In Kubs v. United States,12 4 the court sustained a
verdict for the government because the plaintiff contracted polymyalgia
rheumatica, not GBS, after being vaccinated for swine flu. 125 Similarly,
in Tabaczynski v. United States,1 26 the plaintiff did not prove that his
polymyocitis was caused by the disease even though temporality was
strong-the onset of his disease had occurred approximately one week
after vaccination. 127
3. Biological Plausibility and Coherence
128
This criterion embraces the proposition that an inference of causa-
tion is supported if a cause and effect relationship between exposure and
120. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-O) (1978)
(amended 1979).
121. Ginzburg, supra note 9, at 429.
122. See, eg., Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141, 1147 (10th Cir. 1983) (eleven months
after vaccination); Padgett v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 794, 804 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (sixteen
weeks after vaccination); Thompson v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 581, 585.86 (N.D. Okla.
1981) (more than eleven weeks after vaccination); Hixenbaugh v. United States, 506 F. Supp.
461, 471-72 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (fifteen months after vaccination); Alvarez v. United States, 495
F. Supp. 1188, 1207 (D. Colo. 1980) (seven months after vaccination). But see Sulesky v.
United States, 545 F. Supp. 426, 429-31 (S.D.W. Va. 1982) (relying on medical rather than
epidemiological testimony when plaintiff, having contracted Guillain-Barre syndrome 14
weeks after vaccination, introduced conflicting epidemiological evidence that cast doubt on the
basic premises of the government study).
123. The Swine Flu Act did not provide compensation for illnesses other than Guillain-
Barre syndrome. Farber, supra note 61, at 1233.
124. 537 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
125. Id. at 563.
126. 529 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
127. Id. at 162.
128. In Hill's version, biological plausibility and coherence are separate criteria. Hill,
supra note 80, at 295-300. They have been combined here because of their inherent similarity.
[Vol. 71
EPIDEMIOLOGY
disease is biologically plausible. Further, if such a relationship is consis-
tent with what is already known about the disease, causation is more
likely. Biological plausibility is "often given considerable weight when
assessing [epidemiological] causation." 12 9 Rothman, however, empha-
sizes that these criteria may be "difficult to judge," given that they are
inherently limited by the extent of available knowledge.13 He illustrates
this point with an 1861 quotation about typhus, a disease now known to
be caused by a bacteria transmitted by body lice:'
It [would] be... ridiculous for the stranger who passed the
night in the steerage of an emigrant ship to ascribe the typhus,
which he there contracted, to the vermin with which bodies of
the sick might be infested.... An adequate cause, one reason-
able in itself, must correct the coincidences of simple
experience.
132
This early commentator mistakenly relied on common experience to de-
nounce the cause of typhus, demonstrating that plausibility and coher-
ence, though persuasive, can be misleading. Accordingly, they are not
considered absolute requirements for the establishment of a causal rela-
tionship, and their absence does not disprove causation.
4. Dose-Response Effect
A dose-response effect is present if the occurrence of disease in a
population increases as the exposure quantity increases. 133 A dose-re-
sponse effect logically supports the notion of a cause and effect relation-
ship.13 4 As with plausibility and coherence, satisfaction of the dose-
response criterion is not required for a determination of causation. 35
5. Consistency
The consistency criterion asks whether other studies have generated
similar results. If other epidemiological studies, using different popula-
See, eg., RomMAN, supra note 4, at 19 (suggesting that biological plausibility and coherence
are similar).
129. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 219.
130. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 18-19.
131. 1 HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDmiCINE, supra note 90, at 758.
132. RoTHMAN, supra note 4, at 19 (quoting David W. Cheever, 58 BOSTON MED. SURGI-
CAL . 449, 450 (1861)).
133. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 217-18; ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 18 (terming
dose-response "biologic gradient").
134. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 217.
135. For example, some researchers believe pregnant women's use of DES may cause cervi-
cal carcinoma later in the lives of their female fetuses, yet the causal association "show[s] no
apparent trend of effect with dose." ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 14, 18.
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tions, support an inference of causation, then the association is more
likely to be causal.136 As with some of the other criteria, the presence of
consistency makes the causal argument more persuasive, but the lack of
consistency does not preclude causal inference.137
6. Analogy
The analogy criterion is based on the notion that if substances bio-
logically or chemically similar to the one in question can cause a particu-
lar disease, the substance itself is more likely to cause that disease. For
example, Hill suggests that if one substance ingested by a pregnant wo-
man can cause birth defects, then, by analogy, a similar substance may
cause them as well."3 8 Epidemiologists consider satisfaction of this crite-
rion to be very "weak evidence for causation."' 3 9 The law similarly may
view analogy to be a weak indicator of legal causation. One court held




Experimental evidence confirming the epidemiological findings sup-
ports an inference of causation. For example, when a hypothesized cause
is removed from a population, the occurrence of disease should decrease
if a cause and effect relationship exists."' Such an effect may be seen
when preventive measures are applied to a population. A second type of
experiment adds the putative cause in a controlled manner to a previ-
ously unexposed population; if a cause and effect relationship exists, the
incidence of disease should increase. Although experiments of the latter
type doubtlessly yield compelling evidence, usually ethical mores justifia-
bly preclude such studies.
8. Specificity
Epidemiologists often do not consider specificity a prerequisite for
136. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 219; ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 18.
137. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 18 (stating that "some effects are produced by their causes
only under unusual circumstances").
138. Hill, supra note 80, at 299.
139. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 220.
140. Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (In re Bendectin Litig.), 857 F.2d 290,
321-22 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). The plaintiffs offered evidence that
Thalidomide, another widely publicized morning sickness drug, caused birth defects. Id. The
court ruled that references to Thalidomide were inadmissible because of the potential for preju-
dice. Id.
141. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 218-19.
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causation.142 Specificity embodies the notion of "one cause, one ef-
fect." 143 For example, only exposure to asbestos causes asbestosis, and
only exposure to silicon dust causes silicosis. One problem with specific-
ity is that the manner in which a disease is defined determines whether
specificity exists.144 The terms asbestosis and silicosis encompass, by def-
inition, two separate diseases, each with a single cause. Had the more
general term "fibrosis" been applied to both diseases, specificity would
have been lost. Another problem with the specificity criterion is that a
number of diseases have multiple causes, such as ischemic heart disease,
high blood pressure, and lung cancer.145 Conversely, exposure to some
substances can cause more than one disease. 14 Therefore, although the
presence of specificity tends to prove causation, the absence of specificity
is not meaningful. 47
In law as in epidemiology, specificity is not required to prove causa-
tion. It would be ludicrous to insist that a particular result could have
only one possible cause. A house fire, for example, could have a range of
possible causes, from children experimenting with matches to a faulty
electrical connection. Similarly, it would be ridiculous to insist that a
given cause could have only one effect. The faulty electrical connection,
for example, could cause anything from a mild odor to a full-fledged ex-
plosion. As in epidemiology, however, the presence of specificity is
highly probative of causation: a victim's wound containing a bullet fired
from a particular type of gun makes it highly likely that the victim's
wound was caused by that type of gun.
142. RoTMAN, supra note 4, at 18 (describing the specificity criterion as "useless and
misleading").
143. FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 220.
144. Cf. Feinleib, supra note 65, at 151-52 (noting that a disease's definition may change as
new nuances of the disease arise).
145. See generally Andrew P. Selwyn & Eugene Braunwald, Ischemic Heart Disease, in 2
HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 90, at 964-65 (discussing multi-
ple causes of ischemic heart disease); Gordon H. Williams, Hypertensive Vascular Disease, in 2
HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 90, at 1002-03 (discussing mul-
tiple causes of high blood pressure); John D. Minna, Neoplasms of the Lung, in 2 HARRISON'S
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 90, at 1103-04 (discussing multiple causes of
lung cancer).
146. Fletcher gives the following example. "[L]ung cancer is caused by cigarette smoking,
asbestos, and radiation. Cigarettes cause not only lung cancer but also bronchitis, peptic ulcer
disease, periodontal disease, and wrinkled skin. So the absence of specificity is not much of a
strike against a cause-and-effect relationship." FLETCHER et al., supra note 22, at 220.
147. The requirement for specificity "has often been advanced, especially by those seeking
to exonerate smoking as a cause of lung cancer. Causes of a given effect, however, cannot be
expected to be without other effects on any logical grounds. In fact, everyday experience
teaches us repeatedly that single events may have many effects." ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at
18.
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9. Summary
The term "Bradford Hill criteria" is really a misnomer because it
implies that a set of standards must be met before one can infer epidemi-
ological causation.148 As previously discussed, these criteria are really
guidelines, not absolute requirements; epidemiological causation com-
monly is determined without the presence of every criterion. Only two of
the eight criteria are absolute requirements for causal inference-tempo-
rality and association. These two criteria demand that the cause precede
the effect and that some degree of statistical association between cause
and effect be present. Although temporality and association are
mandatory, they are not determinative of causation. The other criteria
also should be considered, and to the extent they weigh in favor of or
against causal inference, a cause and effect interpretation becomes more
or less likely.
II. USING EPIDEMIOLOGY TO ESTABLISH LEGAL CAUSE
Causation in law and causation in epidemiology can be analogized
to the different methods of measuring time described in the quotation
from Alice in Wonderland at the beginning of this Comment. 149 The
Mad Hatter's watch measured time on a broad-scaled day-by-day basis.
Like the Mad Hatter's watch, epidemiology measures causation
broadly-at the population level. It examines whether exposure to a sub-
stance causes a particular disease in the population. Alice's watch, by
contrast, measured time in smaller increments. The law, like Alice's
watch, attempts to narrow the scope of causation down to the level of the
individual. Just as it would have been difficult for Alice to tell time using
the Hatter's day-based watch, courts understandably have struggled to
determine legal cause on an individual level using population-based epi-
demiological analyses.
The discussion of legal cause in this Comment focuses on negligence
claims, one of the most common theories under which toxic tort lawsuits
are brought. Under a theory of negligence, liability is found when the
plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ant's conduct was negligent and that this negligence was the legal cause
of the plaintiff's injury.
The Second Restatement of Torts defines negligence as "an unrea-
sonable risk of (1) causing harm to a class of persons of which the other
is a member and (2) subjecting the other to the hazard from which the
148. "Criterion" is defined as "a standard, rule, or test on which a judgment or decision
can be based." THE AMERICAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY 341 (2d ed. 1985).
149. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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harm results."15 Population-based epidemiological analyses are useful
both in assessing the risk of harm and in deciding the unreasonableness
of the risk.1"' Population-level causation proves that the substance was
capable of causing disease. This evidence, combined with proof that the
plaintiff was exposed at disease-causing levels to the substance for which
defendant is responsible, satisfies most of the elements of this tort.
Liability requires a finding not only of negligence, but legal cause as
well. 52 The notions of proximate and actual cause, distinct concepts in
the First Restatement, were incorporated by the Second Restatement
into the single concept of legal cause.' 53 The Second Restatement pro-
vides guidance as to what constitutes legal cause. Section 431 states that
"negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if... [the] con-
duct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm."' 154 This section
has two components. The first component embodies the concept of ac-
tual cause, also termed "but-for" cause: "[T]he harm would not have
occurred had the actor not been negligent."' Actual "but-for" causa-
tion in cases involving exposure to harmful substances requires inferen-
tial reasoning. The Restatement's comment to section 431 suggests that
actual cause is necessary but not sufficient. The plaintiff also must show
that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm. This second component incorporates the extent of the defend-
ant's participation."5 6 In the words of the Restatement:
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 cmt. a (1965).
151. See Dore, supra note 7, at 435 ("Epidemiology can prove that a defendant's conduct
put plaintiff at risk."); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
152. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965). The Second Restatement of Torts
states that "[for] a negligent actor [to] be liable for another's harm, it is necessary not only that
the actor's conduct be negligent toward the other, but also that the negligence of the actor be a
legal cause of the other's harm." Id.
153. North Carolina continues to use the term "proximate cause," defined in a recent court
of appeals' decision as follows:
[A] cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and in-
dependent cause, produced the plaintiff's injuries, and without which the injuries
would not have occurred, and one from which a person of ordinary prudence could
have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or consequences of a generally injurious
nature, was probable under all the facts as they existed.
Warren v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 92, 100, 377 S.E.2d 249, 254 (1989) (quoting Hairston v.
Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 310 N.C. 227, 233, 311 S.E.2d 559, 565 (1984) (citing Kanoy v.
Hinshaw, 273 N.C. 418, 160 S.E.2d 296 (1968))); see Robert G. Byrd, Proximate Cause in
North Carolina Tort Law, 51 N.C. L. REv. 951, 954-55 (1973).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
155. Id. § 431 cmt. a.
156. See id. Cases generally require that the plaintiff establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's in-
jury. See, e.g., Hart v. Ivey, 102 N.C. App. 583, 592, 403 S.E.2d 914, 920 (1991) (stating that
liability attaches if the defendant's negligence is a substantial factor in causing injury to the
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The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the de-
fendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as
to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word
in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of
responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense,"
which includes every one of the great number of events without
which any happening would not have occurred.
15 7
Restatement section 432(2) notes an exception to the requirement of
establishing actual cause. This exception applies when two forces com-
bine to cause indivisible harm, one force being the negligent defendant
and the other an outside force. 8 For example, in Anderson v. Minneap-
olis, Saint Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.,159 two fires--one of in-
nocent origin and one due to the defendant's negligence-merged, and
the combined fire caused harm to the plaintiff.1" Under the Restatement
exception, if the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the plaintiff's harm, further proof is not needed and the de-
fendant is liable for the whole injury. 6 Prosser explained this exception
as follows:
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an
plaintiff) (quoting Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 9, 303 S.E.2d 584, 591 (1988)); Wyatt
v. Gilmore, 57 N.C. App. 57, 59, 290 S.E.2d 790, 791 (1982) (stating that an element of proxi-
mate cause is "whether the cause was a substantial factor in bringing about the result"). See
generally Trauberman, supra note 17, at 177, 197 (stating that the "plaintiff must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's behavior was a substantial factor in causing
his or her injury").
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965).
158. Id. Comment a to § 430 states that "[e]xcept as stated in § 432(2), [actual cause] is
necessary." See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353,
1356 (1981) (discussing use of "substantial factor" test in determining actual causation).
159. 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). In Anderson, the defendant was found liable
when two fires, one negligently set by the defendant and the other caused by a bolt of lighten-
ing, merged, and the combined fire destroyed the plaintiff's property. Id. at 440-41, 179 N.W.
at 49.
160. Id.
161. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965); see, e.g., Rozark Farms v. Ozark
Border Elec. Coop., 849 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1988) (Liability for a plaintiff's entire damages
attaches to any negligent tortfeasor when "plaintiff's damages arise out of an indivisible loss
which the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing."). Some courts view this
as a weaker standard for establishing liability and restrict its use to specific factual situations.
In Bendectin Litigation, a weaker standard applied "only to initial negligent actors in deter-
mining their liability in the face of action by a subsequent actor, or in determining causation
between simultaneous actors, both of whose acts could have been "but for" causes of plaintiffs'
injuries." Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (In re Bendectin Litig.), 857 F.2d
290, 311 (6th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 48 U.S. 1006 (1989). The court also rejected a "related,
but somewhat distinct 'increased the risk' standard." Id. at 311 n.15 (citing Cooper v. Sisters
of Charity, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971)).
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event that their combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-
for cause of the event, and application of the but-for rule to
them individually would absolve all of them, the conduct of
each is a cause in fact of the event. 162
The focus here is again on the extent of the defendant's participation and
responsibility.
When the plaintiff has been exposed to a disease-causing substance,
one could view two or more forces in operation: a negligent force and
one or more outside forces. The negligent force would be exposure to the
substance, and the outside forces would be other components that com-
bine with the negligent substance exposure to cause the disease. 163 This
model first requires proof that exposure to the substance can cause the
disease, and, second, that exposure was a substantial factor in the plain-
tiff's case. The second criterion means that exposure must have been so
related to the event that it could be considered a but-for cause. The Mis-
souri Court of Appeals recently used this logic in its analysis:
[A]lthough our law requires proof of cause to recover in tort, it
does not require proof of a single cause. The substantial factor
standard-which ascribes liability to a cause which has played
an important part in the production of the harm, even though
the harm may have occurred absent that cause--is particularly
suited to injury from chronic exposure to toxic chemicals where
the subsequent manifestation of biological disease may be the
result of a confluence of causes.'
Consistent with this approach, Rothman analogizes the causes of
disease to the pieces of a pie.' 65 Each piece represents a cause contribut-
ing to the disease. When all of the contributing causes are assembled into
a whole pie, the disease occurs. With a disease such as high blood pres-
sure, for example, the contributing causes could be genetic propensity,
exposure to salt in the diet, exposure to stress, and other unknown fac-
tors. Each person's pie is unique; the size and relative contribution of
each contributing cause varies from individual to individual. In some
people, the genetic component is particularly strong, yielding a large
162. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at
268 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
163. See generally McElveen & Eddy, supra note 32, at 32 (articulating a multiple cause
scientific theory for cancer). For a discussion of multiple cause involving a negligent defendant
and one or more outside innocent causes, see Robert G. Byrd, Actual Causation in North
Carolina Tort Law, 50 N.C. L. REv. 261, 275 (1972).
164. Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert denied, 493 U.S.
817 (1989).
165. For an in-depth description of this model, including the strength of various causes,
interaction among causes, and the proportion of disease due to specific causes, see ROTHMAN,
supra note 4, at 10-16.
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piece attributable to genetics that has filled most of the pie. For such an
individual, a small piece of any other cause would make a whole pie and
result in high blood pressure. Other individuals have such a small ge-
netic component that no amount of dietary salt or stress at work will
result in high blood pressure.
This model helps explain why exposure to a substance causes disease
in some people but not others and underscores the difficulty of ascribing
causation to a single factor. It also emphasizes that population-based
epidemiological studies measure averages. Conceptually, everyone's pies
are different for any given disease. Some of us require very little expo-
sure to a particular "cause" to develop a disease; others require a larger
exposure; still others will never contract the disease regardless of the
magnitude of the exposure.
In summary, establishing liability under a claim of negligence gener-
ally requires that a plaintiff prove both negligence and legal cause; in
other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct posed
an unreasonable risk of harm, and that the defendant's negligence "was
more likely than not a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's
injury. 166 There are really two steps in proving legal causation. The
first is a population-level analysis which asks whether the substance is
"capable of causing the type of harm from which the particular plaintiff
suffers."' 167 The second is an individual-level determination which exam-
ines whether the substance caused harm in the particular plaintiff.168 Ep-
idemiological studies can be relevant in both steps of the causation
analysis. It should be emphasized, however, that any causation determi-
nation should involve more than simply applying statistical measures of
association. Statistical association by itself does not establish disease
causation at either the population or the individual level.'
69
A. Admissibility of Epidemiological Evidence to Prove Legal Cause
In jurisdictions with rules of evidence similar to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, epidemiological studies may form the basis for expert testi-
mony or be admitted as evidence through the public records and reports
exception to the hearsay rule."' 0 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires
that the expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
166. Dore, supra note 7, at 430.
167. Farber, supra note 61, at 1227.
168. Id. Dore recognizes these concepts and suggests that causation may be divided into
"risk"-the population-level analysis and "occurrence"-the causation issue at the individual
level. Dore, supra note 7, at 435.
169. See supra notes 85-148 and accompanying text.
170. E.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1240 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
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dence or to determine a fact in issue."'' An expert may testify with or
without offering an opinion, as long as the testimony will "assist the trier
of fact."' 72 When the expert offers an opinion, no prior disclosure of the
basis of the opinion is needed; however, the rules anticipate that the sci-
entific data will be revealed on cross-examination. 73 The expert is per-
mitted to base his or her opinion on inadmissible studies, but they must
be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."' 74 The admissibility of
expert opinion testimony, therefore, depends on whether the studies are
of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field. As suggested in
McCormick on Evidence, "[t]he judge and the attorneys may treat the
matter in a hearing under Rule 104." 71 Alternatively, doubts as to the
bases of an opinion could lead to the testimony being stricken or merely
affect the weight of the evidence.
176
Whether an epidemiological study is used as the basis for expert tes-
timony or proffered as evidence itself, the basic principles of relevancy
and prejudice apply.17 7 As stated by Professor George James, relevancy
(citing FED. R. EvID. 803(8)), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234
(1988).
171. FED. R. EVID. 702.
172. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id. This standard applies in North
Carolina. See, eg., Tomkins v. Log Sys., Inc., 96 N.C. App. 333, 337, 385 S.E.2d 545, 548
(1989) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (1988) (N.C. R. EVID. 702)), rev. denied, 326 N.C. 366,
389 S.E.2d 819 (1990).
173. The Federal Rules of Evidence state: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination." FED. R. EvID. 705.
174. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
In North Carolina, the phrase "reasonably relied upon by experts" has been construed to
mean "inherently reliable." Cherry v. Harrell, 84 N.C. App. 598, 605-06, 353 S.E.2d 433, 438
(1991) (applying "inherently reliable" standard articulated prior to adoption of the rules by
State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 462, 251 S.E.2d 407, 412 (1979)), rev. denied, 320 N.C. 167, 358
S.E.2d 49 (1987). For an expanded discussion, see Walter J. Blakey, Examination of Expert
Witnesses in North Carolina, 61 N.C. L. REv. 2, 20-32 (1982).
175. STRONG, supra note 81, § 15, at 67 & n.11.
176. Id. § 13, at 56 n.15.
177. E.g., id. § 203, at 875-76.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
"is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists as a
relation between an item of evidence and a proposition sought to be
proved."17 Therefore, the relevance of epidemiological studies is deter-
mined in the context of a relation between the study and the proposition
to be proved-usually, legal causation in the individual plaintiff. Federal
Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as that which has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." 179 The threshold for this determination is low:
"[I]t is enough if the item could reasonably show that a fact is slightly
more probable than it would appear without that evidence."1 ' A finding
of relevance, however, does not assure admissibility. Under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403, the potential for prejudice and jury misuse may render
relevant evidence inadmissible.181 The relevancy and prejudice analysis
has been characterized as a three-step process: first, a relevancy determi-
nation; second, an assessment of the potential for prejudice; and third, a
balancing of relevancy and prejudice.182
1. Assessing the Probative Value of an Epidemiological Study
Epidemiological studies are statistic-based. Because of this, juries
often view epidemiological studies as connoting scientific certainty when
there may be none and infer individual causation without adequate ba-
sis.18 3 The probative value of epidemiological calculations breaks down
178. George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REv. 689, 690
(1941).
179. FED. IL EVID. 401.
180. STRONG, supra note 81, § 185, at 776.
181. FED. R. EVID. 403. The rule states in pertinent part that "[a]lthough relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Id.; eg., STRONG, supra note
81, § 185, at 779-81; Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1239 (1980) (evidence ex-
cluded if potential prejudice substantially outweighs probative value).
The North Carolina Supreme Court applied this analysis in a 1987 case addressing the
relevance of statistics to the issue of paternity. State v. Jackson, 320 N.C. 452, 461, 358 S.E.2d
679, 683 (1987). The Jackson court upheld the admission of testimony about statistical data,
but excluded as prejudicial the expert's statement that the defendant "'probably [was] the
father of the child.'" Id. at 461, 358 S.E.2d at 683. Notably, this case was decided in the wake
of an earlier "probability of paternity" case, Cole v. Cole, 74 N.C. App. 247, 328 S.E.2d 446,
aff'd, 314 N.C. 660, 335 S.E.2d 897 (1985). In Cole, the court overruled a finding of paternity
based on a 95.98% probability of paternity when additional evidence showed the man to be
sterile. Id. at 255, 328 S.E.2d at 451.
182. Giannelli, supra note 181, at 1235.
183. See generally Dore, supra note 7, at 437-38 (stating that juries may be unduly influ-
enced by apparent certainty of statistic-based studies); Tribe, supra note 99, at 1331 (discussing
the potential for jury misuse of numerical evidence). For a general discussion of the admissi-
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in the transition from population to individual-level causation. 18 4 Fur-
ther, epidemiological studies carry a substantial potential for jury confu-
sion and misuse. 85 Dore remarks that
[u]sing epidemiological evidence... presents the danger of con-
fusing and prejudicing the jury, which... may well confuse a
showing that the defendant's conduct increased the plaintiff's
risk of disease with proof that the defendant's conduct more
likely than not caused the plaintiff's disease.... Furthermore,
juries may tend to give epidemiological evidence excessive
weight. 186
Dore views epidemiological evidence as statistical evidence. 18 7 In this
context, his statements are in accord with this Comment, which asserts
that statistics alone do not establish causation in either epidemiology or
the law.' Professor Laurence H. Tribe also cautions against the risk of
jury misuse of mathematical-based studies:
[I]n at least some contexts, permitting any use of certain mathe-
matical methods entails a sufficiently high risk of misuse, or a
risk of misuse sufficiently costly to avoid, that it would be irra-
tional not to take such misuse into account when deciding
whether to permit the methods to be employed at all.'89
Some courts have adopted a particular value for the risk ratio as a
cut-off point for sufficiency under a "more likely than not" standard for
legal causation in the individual. 190 These courts recognize that when
the risk ratio equals two, the ARP is 50%-indicating a two-fold in-
crease in risk. However, these courts incorrectly assume this translates
into a 50% chance that the plaintiff's disease was caused by exposure to
the substance. The court in Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co. 9 stated that "a
two-fold increased risk is an important showing for plaintiffs to make
because it is the equivalent of the required legal burden of proof-a
showing of causation by a preponderance of the evidence or, in other
words, a probability of greater than 50%. "192 According to Professor
bility of epidemiological evidence, see Richard E. Hoffman, The Use of Epidemiologic Data in
the Courts, 120 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 190, 192-93 (1984).
184. Robins & Greenland, supra note 42, at 1125-26.
185. Dore, supra note 7, at 435.
186. Id. at 437.
187. Id. at 431.
188. See supra notes 85-148 and accompanying text.
189. Tribe, supra note 99, at 1331.
190. See, eg., cases cited supra note 41.
191. 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Wheelehan v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987).
192. Id. According to one commentator, "Courts have typically equated this required jury
determination [i.e., preponderance of the evidence] with a degree of certainty exceeding fifty
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Sherman, these courts follow a "so-called 'weak' preponderance rule
with respect to statistical proof,] ... [an] approach [that] allows a plain-
tiff to recover upon a statistical showing of likelihood of causation (in
excess of fifty percent), even if there is no direct evidence linking the
plaintiff or his injuries to the defendant or its product."19 3 As docu-
mented in epidemiological and statistical literature, however, population-
based calculations should not be extrapolated directly to the
individual.
194
Dore notes that "[c]ourts that fail to distinguish the issue of risk
from that of actual causation may... erroneously permit the evidence of
risk to establish causation." 195 Consider the following hypothetical:
The plaintiff files a lawsuit alleging negligence. Facts in evi-
dence establish that the plaintiff had worked for the defendant
for twenty years before contracting lung cancer. He claims that
because of the defendant's negligence, he was exposed to dis-
ease-causing levels of a harmful substance which caused his
cancer. The plaintiff first convinces the court that the sub-
stance can cause lung cancer at the population level by offering
evidence satisfying most of the Bradford Hill criteria. He
utilizes several workplace studies of men who had been exposed
to low levels of the substance for approximately ten years. The
plaintiff had been exposed to high levels of the substance for
twenty years. The plaintiff now seeks to use the studies' rela-
tively low ARPs of approximately 51% to establish legal causa-
tion at the level of the individual.
In this hypothetical, the plaintiff seeks to introduce ARPs from sev-
eral studies to prove legal cause. However, each ARP represents an aver-
age value that should not be applied as a definitive cut-off for a given
level of proof. 196 Whether a study ARP should be applied to show cau-
sation in an individual plaintiff depends on several factors. One such
factor is the magnitude of the ARP. A large ARP, in the range of 90-
99%, would certainly tend to support an inference of individual cause.
percent." David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 857 (1984) (citing MICHAEL 0. FINKEL-
STEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 66-67 (1978) and CHARLES T. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 31, at 118 (1935)).
193. Sherman, supra note 95, at 384.
194. Robins & Greenland, supra note 42, at 1134-35. This is largely due to "the unknown
mechanisms by which exposure affects disease risk and competing risks[,] ... the unknown
degree of heterogeneity in the background risks of disease, and.., the unknown degree of
dependence between risk of disease and competing risks." Id.; see also supra notes 65-84 and
accompanying text (discussing internal and external validity).
195. Dore, supra note 7, at 436.
196. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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But perhaps the most important factor is external validity-the ability to
apply study results to those outside the study. External validity as it
applies to an individual would depend on the plaintiff's similarity to the
subject population; accordingly, a comparison between the study popula-
tion and the plaintiff is needed.
Returning to the hypothetical, the magnitudes of the studies' ARPs,
at approximately 51%, are quite low. It is possible, because of factors
such as scientific bias, that the ARPs actually lie below 50%.197 If this is
the case, then one could not even say that the disease of a person within
one of the study populations was "more likely than not" associated with
exposure to the substance. If an ARP cannot be applied to an individual
within the study population, then it certainly should not be applied to an
individual, such as the plaintiff, outside of the study. Accordingly, an
ARP should not be used as evidence of legal cause unless more evidence
is presented.
In the hypothetical case, however, the plaintiff can prove additional
facts that support an inference of individual causation. For example, he
was exposed to the harmful substance for a greater number of years than
were the subjects in the studies, during which time his daily exposure
levels were higher. These facts support the notion that any ARP applica-
ble to the plaintiff probably would be greater than 51% and evidence
based on these studies should be admitted. Ultimately, the decision
would rest with the court. 198
In conclusion, the probative value of an epidemiological study
clearly depends on a number of factors. These factors include magnitude
of the risk ratio or ARP, adequacy of the study design, scientific bias,
precision, external validity, and the presence or absence of other studies.
It would be erroneous, therefore, to find the numerical values from epide-
197. Conversely, the ARP could lie above 51%.
198. The notion of adding to and subtracting from a probability is one that should be
familiar to any court that has used Bayes theorem. For a description of Bayes theorem, see
generally David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REv.
34, 49-53 (1979) (illustrating how the formula can be used to convey to jurors the probative
force of quantitative evidence); David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories,
1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 101, 106-08 (1979) (demonstrating how the formula can be used to de-
scribe the way knowledge of a new item of evidence would influence a completely rational
decision maker's evaluation of the probability of some fact in dispute). With Bayes theorem,
evidence supportive of causation would increase the ARP by a specific amount and evidence
tending to negate causation would decrease it. However, Bayes theorem creates a statistic that
is only as accurate as the numbers on which it was premised. Although in some cases Bayes
theorem could provide a closer approximation of the applicable ARP value, this advantage
may be negated by the danger of prejudice resulting from the perception of certainty by courts
of mathematical formulas.
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miological studies relevant to show legal causation in an individual plain-
tiff without considering these other factors.
2. Conditions for Admissibility of Epidemiological Evidence
a. The Frye Rule
Many courts require that certain conditions be met for evidence
based on scientific studies to be admissible. 99 The original test,"° estab-
lished in Frye v. United States,20 1 requires that the scientific evidence
have gained "general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs.""2 2 Lately, the "Frye rule" has been criticized, and some courts
apply the rule only to questionable scientific methodologies, rather than
to the results of particular studies.2 °3 Some commentators object to plac-
ing explicit conditions on admissibility, urging that "traditional stan-
dards of relevancy and the need for expertise-and nothing more--
should govern. ' '2 4
b. Epidemiological Evidence
Several commentators advocate restrictions on the admissibility of
epidemiological evidence, including:
[1.] Restrictions upon the admission of epidemiological stud-
ies as to which inadequate discovery has been provided....
[2.] Admission only of epidemiological evidence which satis-
fies the Henle Koch Postulates and also demonstrates an attrib-
utable risk for the factor in question in excess of 50 percent.
[3.] Admission only of epidemiological studies which are
highly statistically significant.20 5
The restrictions advocated by Professor Bert Black and Dr. David
Lilienfeld are the most comprehensive, requiring: (1) a finding of causa-
tion at the population level using appropriate criteria, and (2) an ARP of
greater than 50%.206 Black and Lilienfeld argue that if their test is ap-
plied, then the legal standard will be satisfied. In other words, they claim
199. See, e'g., STRONG, supra note 81, § 203, at 868.
200. Id. § 203, at 869.
201. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
202. Id. at 1014. For a discussion of the history of the "Frye rule," see Giannelli, supra
note 181, at 1204-31.
203. See, eg., STRONG, supra note 81, § 203, at 871. But cf Giannelli, supra note 181, at
1204-31 (concluding that "Frye may be tottering, but has not yet fallen").
204. STRONG, supra note 81, § 203, at 874.
205. 2 DoR, supra note 22, § 25.05(2) (citing Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 105, at 767);
Dore, supra note 89, at 691-95.
206. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 105, at 767.
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that satisfaction of the test assures that it would be more likely than not
that a particular plaintiff's disease was caused by the exposure.2z 7 This
reasoning is unacceptable because it represents an attempt to substitute
directly a population-based standard for an individual-based standard.
In addition, Black and Lilienfeld recommend using the Henle-Koch pos-
tulates in every situation. These postulates, however, usually apply only
when an infectious agent is involved.2 "8 Finally, they downplay the
problem of study bias and the crucial concept of external validity. 20 9
Rather than espousing specific criteria, it would be more useful for
courts to use qualitative guidelines that indicate whether epidemiological
evidence is relevant in a given situation. 10 Admittedly, such guidelines
should not eliminate completely the use of numerical epidemiological
measures, but rather should condition their admission on the presence of
additional qualitative evidence.211
B. Guidelines for the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Toxic Tort
Lawsuits
The toxic tort lawsuit presents a perplexing problem; its outcome is
highly uncertain and its resolution usually involves enormous financial
stakes.212 Epidemiological studies are crucial elements of proof in these
lawsuits. Guidelines based on epidemiological tenets could prove ex-
tremely useful to a court attempting to extrapolate population-based data
to the level of the individual plaintiff. Guidelines could assist a judge in
determining whether an epidemiological study is "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field," the threshold for admissi-
207. Id.
208. See supra note 105.
209. In a footnote, the authors allude to the notion of external validity as they caution the
reader that exposure levels in the epidemiological study should be the same as or greater than
those in the plaintiff. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 105, at 767 n.143. This, however, would
result in an over-estimation of the risk to the plaintiff. To make an inference of individual
causation, the exposure levels in the epidemiological study actually should be as similar as
possible to those experienced by the plaintiff.
210. A more qualitative test was proposed by two commentators in 1983 in the context of
sufficiency, not admissibility. It would require that the plaintiff establish: "(1) exposure signif-
icant enough to trigger disease; (2) a demonstrated, biologically plausible relationship between
the chemical and disease; (3) the diagnosis of such disease in the plaintiff; and (4) expert opin-
ion that the plaintiff's disease was... consistent with exposure to the chemical." Khristine L.
Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV.
ENvTL. L. RaV. 441, 445 (1983).
211. See Dore, supra note 7, at 431 (stating that epidemiological evidence "may help
demonstrate that a particular event occurred, but only when accompanied by more specific
evidence").
212. DEBORAH H. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION, THE STORY BEHIND
THE STATISTICS 31 (1987).
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bility of expert opinion testimony.213 Additionally, guidelines could aid
the judge in the determination of basic relevancy and the potential for
prejudice.214 After admissibility issues are decided, similar guidelines
could be helpful in determining sufficiency of the evidence.
1. Guidelines for Admissibility
The following guidelines are proposed for evaluating the admissibil-
ity of epidemiological evidence when seeking to prove legal cause in an
individual plaintiff:215 (1) whether the plaintiff can prove facts from
which an inference of population-level causation could be made, through
the examination of factors such as strength of the statistical association,
biological plausibility, and consistency among studies; and (2) whether
the plaintiff can prove facts to support an adequate degree of external
validity-that the pertinent characteristics of the epidemiological study
populations, including exposure level, were similar enough to those of the
plaintiff to make extrapolation reliable.
The first guideline requires that the plaintiff be able to prove facts
from which an inference of population-level causation could be made.
Causation at the population level may be determined using traditional
epidemiological methods, including application of the Bradford Hill cri-
teria or similar guidelines.216 As already discussed, two absolute require-
ments for a finding of causation at the population level are temporality
and statistical association.21 7 Evidence of strength in these criteria
should be shown and, if possible, in other suitable criteria such as biologi-
cal plausibility and coherence, dose-response gradient, consistency, anal-
ogy, experimental evidence, and specificity. 218 Factors such as study
bias219 and lack of precision 220 also should be accorded full considera-
tion. These factors go to the very heart of the study, asking whether the
study results really represent what a party claims they do.
213. FED. R. EViD. 703.
214. See generally STRONG, supra note 81, § 203, at 875 (discussing the admissibility of
scientific evidence).
215. This Comment offers open-ended guidelines, allowing courts to evaluate fully the case
at hand, using the standards and evidentiary devices they prefer.
216. See supra notes 103-48 and accompanying text. A recent scientific paper describes the
Bradford Hill criteria as "uniform scientific criteria" and recommends their use in toxic tort
cases. Muscat & Huncharek, supra note 108, at 997-98. However, as previously discussed, the
Bradford Hill criteria should be considered guidelines, not explicit criteria. Other criteria may
be better suited to certain exposure-disease combinations. See supra note 105.
217. See supra text accompanying note 103.
218. See supra notes 103-48 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
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This first guideline probably could best be applied as a conditional
relevancy test.221 The relevancy of an epidemiological study to prove
individual-level causation depends on a condition-the existence of pop-
ulation-level causation. As such, it should be admitted "upon, or subject
to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of" popu-
lation-level causation.222 Courts and commentators agree that admissi-
bility of epidemiological studies to show individual causation should be
conditioned on such proof.223 Some judges have ordered bifurcated or
trifurcated trials,224 addressing the issue of population-level causation
prior to that of legal cause. For example, in the recent Bendectin Litiga-
tion, the trial judge ordered a trifurcated trial, first addressing the issue of
causation.225 The court of appeals upheld a finding of no causation at the
population level under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review and ac-
cordingly affirmed that the question of legal cause at the individual plain-
tiff level was moot.226 In addition, the court held that trifurcation was
not a source of unfair prejudice and was dispositive of the individual-
level causation issue.
227
Alternatively, the first guideline also could be considered under a
more traditional relevancy-based approach. Professor George James
wrote that a relevancy analysis involves deductive logic, which in turn
depends on the existence of a "major premise" for its effect.228 Accord-
ingly, the following sequence could be established for epidemiological
evidence:
The plaintiff was exposed to substance X through the defend-
ant's negligence. The plaintiff later developed disease Y.
To take the next logical step, that "the apparent probability of [the de-
fendant's negligence] is now greater than before the evidence ... was
received," 229 the following major premise would need to be established
221. Rule 104(b) states that "[w]hen the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment
of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (In re Bendectin Litig.), 857
F.2d 290, 317 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that determination that Bendectin did not cause birth
defects at the population level was "dispositive of the litigation"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006
(1989). But see Wendy E. Wagner, Note, Trans-Science in Torts, 96 YALE L.J. 428, 430-31
(1986) (urging that population-level causation should not be necessary, just that plaintiff's
injury be "consistent with that substance").
224. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (allowing the judge to separate issues at trial).
225. Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at 296.
226. Id. at 294.
227. Id. at 314-17.
228. James, supra note 178, at 694-99.
229. Id. at 699.
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first:
MAJOR PREMISE: Persons exposed to substance X are more
likely to develop disease Y than those not exposed.
This premise could be satisfied through a population-level causation
determination.
Under the second guideline, the plaintiff should be able to prove that
the subject population is similar enough to the plaintiff to make possible
the extrapolation of the study results to the plaintiff. Essentially, this
guideline requires the court to perform an external validity analysis. As
Dore states, "If the characteristics of the study group differ markedly
from those of the plaintiffL]... the results of the study cannot be applied
reliably to the plaintiff. For example, studies of occupational risks may
reveal little about dangers to the general public. '230 Consider the follow-
ing two hypothetical plaintiffs:
The first plaintiff is a twenty-year-old woman who has devel-
oped a rare form of cancer and claims the defendant is liable
because she was exposed to "substance X" ten years ago when
workers used it in her home for a period of two weeks. The
second plaintiff is a fifty-year-old man who has been using
"substance X" in his job more than thirty hours a week for the
past fifteen years and has developed the same rare cancer.
Both plaintiffs seek to use epidemiological studies implicating "substance
X" as a cause of the rare cancer. The subjects in the epidemiological
studies were men who had been exposed to "substance X" for an average
of twenty years in an occupational setting. Although epidemiological
study results should not be applied automatically to either plaintiff,
clearly there are factors which make the study more generalizable to the
second plaintiff. The key is determining which characteristics are perti-
nent to the issue of causation and which are not. Expert testimony can
be helpful here, and, at the very least, a court can look for the existence
of characteristics such as gender, age, and level of exposure, which are
similar in the plaintiff and the subject population.
2. Guidelines for Sufficiency
This Comment proposes the following guideline to be used when
evaluating the sufficiency of epidemiological evidence: whether the plain-
tiff has proved the facts in (1) and (2), above,23' as well as additional facts
that make it more likely than not that exposure to a particular substance
caused the plaintiff's disease. One such additional fact could be a strong
230. Dore, supra note 7, at 435-36 (citations omitted).
231. See supra text accompanying note 215.
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statistical association between exposure and the occurrence of disease at
the population level.232 Epidemiological study results indicating a strong
association between exposure and disease would tend to support, but not
be determinative of, legal causation. To be considered a strong associa-
tion, the risk ratio should be greater than or equal to eight (ARP greater
than or equal to 87%).233 Strong associations should not always be re-
quired, however. A moderate association234 coupled with strength in
other epidemiological causation guidelines, such as a strong temporal re-
lationship, also could satisfy this guideline.235 With a weak association,
the plaintiff should probably show strength in other epidemiological cau-
sation guidelines and, in addition, similarity between the plaintiff and
those in the study population.
III. CONCLUSION
Analyzing causation when epidemiology and the law converge is
complex, often requiring an interpretation of research at the very fron-
tiers of modem science. An epidemiologist makes population-level cau-
sation determinations, relying on both statistic-based analyses and
qualitative criteria such as temporality, biological plausibility, and con-
sistency. The courts, on the other hand, have a greater, more difficult
task--determining causation not only at a population level, but also at
the level of the individual. Courts are inconsistent in their treatment of
epidemiological evidence. If courts are to apply epidemiology, 236 it is
232. Professor E. Donald Elliott has proposed that courts rely on strong causal associa-
tions. E. Donald Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis for Toxic Compensation
Schemes, 73 GEo. L.J. 1357, 1368 (1985).
233. See supra Table I, text accompanying notes 37-40. As stated by Sherman, "If this
statistical correlation is large, plaintiffs could point to it as evidence of causation in the sense
that the product was a substantial factor in producing their claimed injury." Sherman, supra
note 95, at 381 (referring to the Agent Orange litigation).
234. See supra Table I, text accompanying notes 37-40.
235. Epidemiological causation guidelines, such as the Bradford Hill criteria, are described
at supra notes 103-48 and accompanying text.
236. Proposals have been made in the context of toxic tort litigation to replace the tradi-
tional tort system with policy-based alternative liability schemes. Several commentators have
advocated a model allowing plaintiffs to be compensated in proportion to the level of risk from
a particular exposure. See Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific
Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other Environmental Diseases in Individuals, 10 J.
HEALTH POL. PoL'Y L. 33, 58 (1985) (recommending that legislatures adopt policy of com-
pensation proportional to risk); Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindelk Relaxation of Cause-In-
Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 908 (1982) (encouraging a pro-
portionate recovery system); Rosenberg, supra note 192, at 859-60 (arguing that liability and
compensation should be proportional to risk). Professor Farber discusses another risk-based
compensation system, the "Most Likely Victim Model." Farber, supra note 61, at 1221.
Under this model, "plaintiffs whose injuries were least likely to have been caused by the de-
fendant receive nothing, while those with the highest causation probabilities get full compensa-
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vitally important that they have some understanding of the applications
and limitations of its basic tenets.
The guidelines proposed in this Comment recognize that statistic-
based population data represent at best a rough approximation,2 37 and
for this reason should not be applied with certainty to an individual
plaintiff in the absence of other evidence. Risk ratios and ARPs from an
epidemiological study generally may not be extrapolated with precision
to particular subjects within the study itself, largely due to the potential
for study bias, lack of study precision, and the inherent variability in any
human population.238 Even if the results could be applied to individuals
within the study, they may not be relevant to persons outside the study.
External validity, the ability to generalize to persons outside the study, is
a crucial determinant in the analysis of causation in the individual plain-
tiff.239 Judge Weinstein, in the Agent Orange litigation, stated:
While it may be possible to prove, through the use of such
proof as... epidemiological evidence, that such harm-for ex-
ample cancer--can be "caused" by a particular substance, it
may be impossible to pinpoint which particular person's cancer
would have occurred naturally and which would not have oc-
curred but for exposure to the substance.240
The proposed guidelines respond to these difficulties and recommend
that courts consider more than the statistic-based elements of epidemio-
logical proof. Qualitative factors such as consistency among studies and
external validity should also be addressed.
Professor Tribe urges careful scrutiny of statistics in the courtroom
tion." Id. Another proposed system creates a new cause of action based on group
compensation. Kenneth A. Cohen, Class Actions, Toxic Torts, and Legal Rules, 67 B.U. L.
REv. 581, 597 (1987). In this system, rather than proving individual-level causation, plaintiffs
must prove they are members of a group for which causation has been established for a partic-
ular substance. Id. But see PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 268-72 (1986)
(arguing that the group compensation model violates traditional tort doctrine by requiring
defendants to compensate individuals they did not injure). Professor Sherman has suggested
combining the class action suit with proportional recovery schemes, liability being delegated
according to the ARP. Sherman, supra note 95, at 381. In a class action suit, the plaintiff
could use epidemiological evidence to establish population-level causation. Plaintiffs able to
show exposure to the substance and membership in the group for whom population-level cau-
sation has been established could receive damages "proportionate to the increased incidence of
the condition" relative to the general population. Id. An in-depth discussion of alternative
liability systems is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an overview, see generally 2 DORE,
supra note 22, §§ 6.01-07.
237. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
240. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
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and acknowledges that statistics have some utility "when properly
combined with other, more conventional evidence." '241 The proposed
guidelines are in accord with this view, recommending that courts re-
quire more than numerical epidemiological measures. They should not
simply accept data from an epidemiological study as applicable to a given
plaintiff. Regarding this matter, Professor Louis L. Jaffe has stated:
[A]bstract probability may play a role in finding a fact, but
what is referred to in the traditional formula is the greater
probability in the case at hand. The 'probabilities' in the ab-
stract or statistical sense is only a datum. The jury's quest for
the fact can only be undertaken if there is evidence in addition
to that upon which the mere abstraction is based which will
enable the jury to make a reasoned choice between the compet-
ing possibilities.... There must be a rational, i.e., evidentiary
basis on which the jury can choose the competing possibilities.
If there is not, the finding will be based (in the words of the
formula) on mere speculation and conjecture. 42
In using epidemiology to prove legal cause, courts have found them-
selves in a statistic-based quandary. Can epidemiology be trusted?
Should it be rejected? Or does its proper use lie somewhere in-between?
Consider Lewis Carroll's Alice, trying to use the White Rabbit as her
guide, but, ultimately, being forced to rely on her own reasoning. Simi-
larly, although the courts may seek to use epidemiology, resolution of the
issue of causation ultimately depends on a tempered application of epide-
miology within the logic and reasoning of the law.
MELISSA MOORE THOMPSON
241. Tribe, supra note 99, at 1350. It should be noted that Professor Tribe's comments
were made in the context of a criminal trial where presumably greater precautions are needed
to protect the defendant.
242. Louis L. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BuFF. L. Rrv. 1, 4 (1951) (quoted by
Rosenberg, supra note 192, at 857 n.38).
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